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Belsky: The Religion Clauses and the Really New Federalism

THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE "REALLY NEW"
FEDERALISM

Martin H. Belsky*

1.

INTRODUCTION

It had been a principle of contemporary constitutional law that once a provision of
the Bill of Rights was "fully" incorporated, such as with the First Amendment,1 it
established a constitutional minimum. 2 A state could provide, either by constitutional or
statutory provision, additional protections to its citizens, so long as this did not create a
conflict with other federal law. 3 Another principle, until recently, was that the federal
government had the ability by legislation to provide additional or enhanced rights to
4
Americans, and that these rights applied uniformly to residents of all states.
The application of these two principles-at least as applied to First Amendment
and Equal Protection rights-was relatively straightforward. The criteria for determining
whether a government act violated the Establishment Clause would be applied to any
government actor, whether at the federal, state, or local level. 5 The Free Exercise of
Religion was protected from violation (defined as significant or substantial interference)
by government. 6 Actions by a government entity that might interfere with religious
activity had to survive a strict scrutiny review, that is, a showing of a compelling
government interest and proof that restrictions were as narrowly tailored or least
7
8
restrictive as possi ble.
Discrimination
by government based on race, as well as several
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., Temple University; J.D., Columbia
University; Dip., Cambridge University.
1. See e.g Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985). For a discussion of the whole topic of
incorporation, review Jerold L. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 Geo. L.J. 253 (1982).
2 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw § 1.6(c), 20 (7th ed., West 2004).
3. See Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State Constitutional Law, in The Rehnquist Court" A
Retrospective 217 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002). A state court's application of its own law
will not be overturned so long as it is not in violation of other federal law and it is clear that its decision is
based on an "adequate and independent state ground." Id. at 218. See e.g. Ill. v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182
(1990); Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
4. See eg. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (2000)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000)).
5. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (local school policy); Larson v Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)
(Minnesota statute); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal statute).
6. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7. Id. at 403. See Hobbie v. Unempl. Apps. Commn. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v. Rev.
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other "immutable traits," also had to sustain a strict constitutional scrutiny. 9 Other rights
were protected by "semi-strict" scrutiny 10 or a "hard rational basis" (rational basis "with
teeth") review. 11
If these protections were felt inadequate, Congress under public pressure could and
did enact civil rights statutes that provided additional national protections against
discrimination by public or private players, first as to race, alienage, nationality, religion,
and gender and then later as to disability and age. 12 States were also free to enact their
own civil rights statutes providing additional protections, so long as the statutes did not
conflict with federal law or policy. 13
These two principles--that the Bill of Rights established a constitutional minimum
that states could exceed and the federal government could legislate enhanced
rights-were challenged, and now seemingly inverted, by two Supreme Court decisions:
Locke v. Davey14 and, most recently, Gonzales v. 0 Centro EspiritaBeneficente Uniao

Do Vegetal (0 Centro).15 Civil rights protections for citizens now depend on whether
the violations are by the federal government, state government, or local government.
First, First Amendment protections--the "free exercise" of religion and the "wall of
separation" between church and state--have been limited. 16 Next, federal statutes that
provide additional protections are applied differently now depending on the level of
government. They apply fully to actions by federal officials, but states are free to apply
under their own laws a more stringent set of standards for separation of church and state.
States are also free to pass neutral and general laws that restrict religious practices. 17 This
article describes this evolution, particularly the new two-tier process of review under the
revised concept of federalism indicated by 0 Centro.

Bd.ofthe Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,214 (1972).
8. Discrimination by the federal government, of course, is not precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, which only applies to the States. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 2, at § 14.1, 681.
Classification by the federal government "in a way which would violate the equal protection clause.., will be
held to contravene the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
9. See eg. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (race).
10. See e.g. Clark v. Jeter,486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (illegitimacy); Miss. U for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 723-27 (1982) (gender).
11. The phrases "hard rational basis" and "rational basis with teeth" are used to explain rational basis
review which seems to use a more stringent analysis than merely accepting any government reason for a
discriminatory classification. Justice Marshall called this "second order" rational basis review. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) (disability) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (sexual orientation).
12. See e.g. supra n. 4; Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (age); S.E. Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (disability); L.A. Dept of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(gender); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (race).
13. See e.g. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (California statute for disability insurance that
excluded coverage related to pregnancy); Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox PresbyterianChurch v. Whitman,
99 F.3d 101 (3rd Cir. 1996) (New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation);
Davidson v lona-McGregorFire Protec. & Rescue Dist., 674 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1996) (Florida
statute prohibiting discrimination based on handicap).
14. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
15. _ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (2006).
16. Review infra pt. 11.
17. Review infra pt. V.
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1I.

GONZALES V. 0 CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAo Do VEGETAL

Hoasca is a "sacramental tea" 18 that is "brewed from two plants native to the
Amazon River Basin in South America." 19 Use of hoasca plays a central role in the
21
religious ceremonies of the 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao de Vegetal (UDV).
The UDV church leaders imported the tea from Brazil. 22 On May 21, 1999, federal
customs agents intercepted a shipment of "a substantial quantity" of hoasca. 2 3 The
federal government threatened prosecution, 24arguing that possession, use, or sale of the
plant violated the Controlled Substance Act.
25
UDV then filed suit against federal officials seeking to preclude enforcement.
UDV asked for a preliminary injunction and argued, among other things, that "applying
the Controlled Substances Act to UDV's sacramental use of hoasca violate[d] RFRA
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act].' '26 The district court reviewed the tests of

18.
19.
2002).
20.
21.

126 S. Ct at 1217.
0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D.N.M.

126 S. Ct at 1217 ("Central to UDV's faith is receiving communion through hoasca ).
The district court descnbed UDV as follows:
Founded in Brazil in 1961, the UDV church blends Christian theology with traditional indigenous
religious beliefs. Church doctrine instructs that hoasca is a sacrament, and UDV members ingest
the tea during church services. About 8,000 people belong to the UDV in Brazil. In 1993, the UDV
officially established a branch of the church in the United States. The United States branch of the
UDV, headquartered in Santa Fe, New Mexico, has about 130 members.
282 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
22. Id.
23. Id Three drums of hoasca were seized. 126 S. Ct. at 1217. "A subsequent investigation revealed that
UDV had received 14 prior shipments of hoasca." Id
24. Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801971 (2000). As described by the United States Supreme Court:
[The Act] regulates the importation, manufacture, distribution, and use of psychotropic substances..
Substances listed in Schedule I of the Act are subject to the most comprehensive restrictions,
including an outright ban on all importation and use, except pursuant to strictly regulated research
projects.... One of the plants [in hoasca], psychotria viridis, contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT),
a hallucinogen whose effects are enhanced by alkaloids from the other plant, banisteriopsiscaapi.
DMT, as well as "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of
[DMT]," is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.
126 S. Ct. at 1217.
25. Id. As indicated by the district court,
Although the United States has not filed any criminal charges stemming from UDV officials'
possession of hoasca, the government has threatened prosecution for future possession of the tea. In
light of the government's interpretation of the CSA's application to hoasca, the UDV has ceased
using the tea in the United States.
182 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
26. 126 S. Ct. at 1217. UDV also argued in the lower courts that the actions by the government violated
their rights under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and international laws and treaties. 282 F.
Supp. 2d at 1240. They also made a statutory argument that the Controlled Substances Act, in fact, does not
apply to hoasca. Id. The district court rejected the argument that application of the Controlled Substances Act
violated the First Amendment, finding that the statute was a "neutral law of general applicability," id at 1242,
had a rational basis, and thus, under Empl Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), could be applied to the religious
practice of using hoasca. 282 F. Supp 2d at 1241-47. The court also rejected the Equal Protection claim, as
there was insufficient showing, at least for a preliminary injunction, of selective prosecution. Id. at 1248. It
also rejected a statutory interpretation argument that the Controlled Substances Act did not extend to hoasca.
Id. at 1248-50. Finally, it rejected the argument that hoasca had to be allowed for ceremonial use because of
international law and comity, Brazilian acceptance of the use of hoasca, and international treaties that promote
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RFRA 2 7 and accepted the uncontested claim that application of the Controlled
Substances Act was a substantial burden on the practices of UDV. 2 8 Then, under RFRA,
the burden shifted to the government to show that its actions were "in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest" and were "the least restrictive means of furthering
29
that compelling governmental interest."
The government claimed three compelling interests: (1) the health and safety of
UDV users; (2) the potential diversion of the drug to non-religious use and the risk to
those users; and (3) implementation of a treaty. 30 The evidence of risk from use of
hoasca and of diversion to non-UDV users was "in equipoise" or "virtually balanced,"
and, therefore, the district court held the government did not meet its burden of showing
a compelling interest. 3 1 Regarding the government's third argument, that the United
Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances 32 requires the United States to ban all

uses of hoasca including ceremonial use, 33 the court found that the treaty did not
apply. 34

Thus, this also was not a compelling interest. 3 5

Because it found no

compelling interests, the district court did not reach the issue of whether the ban was the
"least restrictive means" of furthering those interests. 36 It ordered a preliminary
injunction, 37 and that decision was eventually 38 affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of
39
Appeals.

protection of religious freedoms were not bases to reinterpret application of the Controlled Substances Act. Id.
at 1250-52.
27. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
28. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1241, 1252-53; see also 126 S. Ct. at 1217 ("At a hearing on the preliminary
injunction, the Government conceded that the challenged application of the Controlled Substances Act would
substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion by the UDV."). The district court distinguished other cases
where there was some question as to whether use of drugs was really part of a claimant's religious beliefs when
the claimant did not "sincerely" hold those beliefs or when the government's actions did not, in fact,
"substantially burden" the claimant's religious practice. Id. at 1253.
29. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1252 (citing RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)); see also 126 S. Ct. at 1218.
30 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53.
31. Id. at 1262, 1266.
32. Id. at 1266 (citing UN Conv.on Psychotropic Substances, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (opened
for signature Feb. 21, 1971)). The Treaty was ratified by the United States in 1980. Id.
33. Id at 1266.
34. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
35. Id. at 1269.
36. Id. at 1269-70.
37. Id. at 1270.
The injunction requires the church to import the tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control
over the tea to persons of church authority, and to warn particularly susceptible UDV members of
the dangers of hoasca. The injunction also provides that "if [the Government] believe[s] that
evidence exists that hoasca has negatively affected the health of UDV members," or "that a
shipment of hoasca contain[s] particularly dangerous levels of DMT, [the Government] may apply
to the Court for an expedited determination of whether the evidence warrants suspension or
revocation of (the UDV's authority to use hoasca]."
124 S. Ct. at 1218 (internal citations omitted).
38. The government sought and obtained a stay of the district court's order pending appeal. 0 Centro
EspirataBeneficente Uniao De Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463 (10th Cir. 2002). The district court's opinion
was first affirmed by a three-judge panel, 0 Centro Espirata Beneficente Uniao De Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2003), and then again by the en banc court, which also vacated the prior order staying the
injunction. 0 Centro EspirataBeneficente Uniao De Vegetal v Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004).
39. Id The per curium opinion represented a divided Tenth Circuit that was split as to the evidentiary
standards for the granting of a preliminary injunction and also as to whether the government had demonstrated
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The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in an opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts. Applying the tests of RFRA, the Court put the burden of proof on the
government to show compelling interests to overcome the acknowledged substantial
burden on the religious practices of the UDV. 40 In a de novo review, the Court held that
a general interest in precluding drug usage as indicated by the Controlled Substances Act
was not a compelling one:
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the
Government's categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that
the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law "to the
person"-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
41

burdened.

Specifically, the Court rejected the "slippery-slope concerns" that could be raised to any
argument for an exception to a general law. 42 The Court also rejected the government's
on Psychotropic Substances itself provided a compelling
arguments that the Convention
43
ban.
the
justifying
interest
The decision seems unremarkable. The Court simply applied a federal statute
promoting religious freedoms. What makes the case interesting is that the Court rejected
similar arguments-first when applying these same principles as a constitutional
principle and then later when applying these same principles, under the same statute, to
state restrictions.

III.

LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES

Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment Religion
45
Clauses44 to any government action that attempted to breach the "wall of separation
between church and state (the Establishment Clause) or that interfered significantly with

compelling interests to justify restriction on the use of hoasca.
40. 126 S. Ct. at 1220-24.
41. Id. at1220.
Under the more focused inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling interest test, the
Government's mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in
the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day. It is true, of course, that Schedule I substances
such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous. Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress, in
classifying DMT considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue here-the circumscribed,
sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV.
Id.at 1221 (internal citations omitted). In applying the compelling interest test, the Court relied on its cases
applying the First Amendment Free Exercise standards that existed before Empl Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 827.
See 126 S. Ct. at 1220-21.
42. Id.at 1223. The Court continued: "The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of
bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no
exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions
to 'rules of general applicability."' Id.
43. Id. at 1224-25. The Court rejected the district court's conclusion that the treaty did not cover hoasca.
Id However, the Court found that general statements about the "importance of honoring international
obligations" and the need of the United States to maintain its "leadership position" in the "international war on
drugs" were not sufficient to meet the high government burden. 126 S.Ct. at 1225.
44. U.S. Const. amend. I.
45. The "wall of separation" language was used by Thomas Jefferson and quoted in Everson v Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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46
Eventually, it
a person's exercise of his or her religion (the Free Exercise Clause).
established a three-prong Lemon test, based on the holding in Lemon v. Kurtzman,47 to
review any potential infringements of the Establishment Clause. It also established a
strict scrutiny review of any rule that interfered with one's religion or religious
practices. 48 The Lemon test stated,4 9
1. "the statute [or rule]
must have a secular legislative purpose," 50 that is, a clear non51
reason;
religious
2. the "principal or primary effect" of the law, rule, regulation, or practice had to be
one that "neither advances nor inhibits religion," 52 that is, be neutral towards
religion and religions; 53 and
3. the statute or rule could not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion," 54 that is, allow government at any level to become intertwined with
55
religious institutions or principles.

The Supreme Court also established a strict scrutiny for challenges to actions by
government that placed a "substantial burden" on someone's religion and, therefore,
violated the Free Exercise Clause. 56 To justify such a restriction, the government had to
show both a "compelling government interest" 57 and also that the restriction was the
narrowest tailored or least restrictive method to achieve that interest. 58 These tests
applied to all government actions-whether specifically directed to religion or
not.59Under these two rigorous sets of tests, numerous statutes and governmental actions
were found unconstitutional. 60 But by the end of the twentieth century, a different trend
emerged. The composition of the
Supreme Court had changed and so had the level of
61
scrutiny of laws and regulations.

46. See Martin H. Belsky, Antidisestablishmentarianism: The Religion Clauses at the End of the
Millennium, 33 Tulsa L.J. 93, 94 (1997). One commentator described the series of cases decided by the
Warren Court on the religion clauses as "energizing" these protections. See Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don't
Wish Me a Merry Christmas235 (N.Y.U. Press 1997).
47. 403 U.S. 602 (1963). In Lemon, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes that provided aid to parochial schools.
48. Belsky, supra n. 46, at 94.
49 The following discussion is derived from id. at 94-95.
50. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
51. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment of silence statute really intended for prayer);
Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (ban on teaching of evolution lacked non-religious purpose).
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
53 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (mandated reading of Bible and the Lord's
Prayer in school had primary effect of advancing religion)
54. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
55. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-15 (providing aid to parochial schools would entangle state in parochial
school programs); compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-685 (1984) (Christmas exhibit with creche
in city park did not entangle city with religion).
56. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). In Sherbert, the state denied unemployment compensation
payments to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work in a defense factory. Id. at 399-401.
57. Id. at 406.
58. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
59. Thomas C. Berg, On the PermissibleScope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom or Belief in the United
States, 19 Emory Intl. L. Rev. 1277, 1282 (2005); Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and the
"AccommodationistNeutrality ";A Non-Neutral Critique, 84 Or. L. Rev. 935, 949 (2005).
60. See Belsky, supra n. 46, at 95 (describing some of these decisions).
61. John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional
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In a series of decisions, the Court implicitly overruled the three-part Lemon test. 62
The Court now said "that a rule or regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause
unless it indicates a government 'endorsement' of religion or unless the law actually
'coerces' someone to be involved in a religious activity. Neutrality was the key." 6 3 The
best example of the impact of this new set of standards can be found in two cases
reviewing a New York City program that sent public school teachers into parochial
schools. 64 In 1985, in Aguilar v. Felton,65 aspects of the program were found
unconstitutional as they represented an "excessive entanglement of church and state" in
violation of the Lemon test. 66 Twelve years later, the Supreme Court in Agostini v.
Felton6 7 reviewed the same program and applied a less rigorous analysis, ultimately
holding "this carefully constrained program cannot reasonably be viewed as an
endorsement of religion." 68 The program was now valid. Whether the governmental
program was a state or federal one, if it was "neutral" and did not carry with it the
"imprimaturof governmental endorsement," 69 it was constitutional.
The Court also restricted the application of the strict scrutiny test for claims of free
exercise deprivation.7 0 In Employment Division v. Smith,7 1 members of a Native
American church were denied unemployment benefits after being fired for using peyote
as part of an acknowledged legitimate religious ceremony. 72 Use of peyote was a crime
under a general state anti-drug law. 73 A majority of the Supreme Court held the strict
scrutiny review test does not apply when an individual is asked to comply with a "neutral
law of general applicability." 74 The review is minimal-a valid or reasonable
government purpose is sufficient; no compelling government interest is needed. 75 This
lesser level of review is the test for application of any federal or state neutral and general
76
law.
Minimal review of both state and federal actions was now a constitutional doctrine.
Only the Supreme Court could define the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, and a later
attempt by Congress in RFRA to reassert the "compelling interest" and "narrow

Experiment, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 471, 418, 425 (1996) (noting shift toward "narrower" reading of the Free

Exercise Clause and "multi-principled" reading of the Establishment Clause).
62. Martin H. Belsky, Locke v. Davey: States' Rights Meet the New Establishment Clause, 40 Tulsa L.
Rev. 279, 280 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

63. Id.
64. See Belsky, supra n. 46, at 96-98.
65. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).

66. Id. at414.
67. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

68. Id. at 235.
69. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (emphasis in original) (Ohio school voucher
program); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (federal program that supplies funding for materials

and equipment to parochial schools).
70. See Massaro, supra n. 59, at 949 (weakened protection of free exercise rights).
71. 494 U.S. 872.

72. Id. at 874.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982))

75

Id. at 885.

76. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Rupert v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (rational basis

review on ban of ceremonial use of eagle feathers under the federal Bald Eagle Protection Act).
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tailoring" standard77 was, therefore, not valid.78 However, as to both Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause challenges, this uniformity of treatment of both state
and federal actions ran counter to another trend of Supreme Court jurisprudence--the re79
emergence of the power of the states.
IV.

LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW TO STATE ACTIONS

In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed sixty years of constitutional history and reestablished a more
exacting application of the principle of state sovereignty. 80 Ever since the New Deal,
81
and until the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court upheld federal statute after federal statute
and rejected arguments that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited
or superceded by the Tenth Amendment. 82
84
83
This deference to the federal government ended with United States v. Lopez.
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a five-Justice majority, found the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional. 8 5 That statute made it a federal crime
to knowingly possess a gun near or in a school zone. The Court held that the statute was
beyond Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause power

77. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
78. City of Boerne v. Flores,521 U.S. 507 (1997).
79. See Martin H. Belsky, The Rehnquist Court. A Review at the End of the Millennium, in The Rehnquist
Court: A Retrospective 1, 5 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002).
80. David Garrow has indicated that Rehnquist saw granting broader power to the states as a "mission" that
reached all the way back to his time as a clerk to Justice Robert Jackson. See David J. Garrow, William H.
Rehnquist in the Mirror of Justices, in The Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 274, 276-77 (Martin H. Belsky
ed., Oxford U. Press 2002).
81. See Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw 138 (2nd ed., Aspen 2005).
82. Article 1, § 8 provides authority for Congress to regulate interstate, Indian, and foreign commerce. The
Tenth Amendment provides that "[tihe Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." The Supreme Court at
one point used this and other constitutional provisions to restrict the ability of the federal government to enact
social and economic legislation. See Schechter Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918). With the New Deal and the threat of some structural changes in the Court's composition,
the Court expanded federal power under the Commerce Clause and limited the Tenth Amendment to being no
more than a "truism." See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11
(1942).
83. There were some earlier hints about this new "new Federalism" agenda in cases that reviewed a 1974
amendment to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act extending minimum wage and maximum hours rules to
state employees. "The Burger Court briefly flirted with this [state power agenda] in NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery [426 U.S. 833 (1976)] but ultimately abandoned it in Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth [469
U.S. 528 (1985)]." Erwin Chemerinsky, The ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, in The
Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 195, 197 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002). Both decisions were
five to four, with Justice Blackmun changing his position as he found the National League of Cities test both
"unworkable" and "inconsistent with established principles of federalism." Garcia,496 U.S. at 53 1. Justice
[later Chief Justice] Rehnquist predicted:
I join both Justice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's thoughtful dissents.... But under any one of
these approaches [described by other Justices to preclude application of a federal statute to the
states], the judgment in these cases should be affirmed, and I do not think it incumbent on those of
us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court.
Id at 579-580.
84. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
85. Id at 550.
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that the Act regulated activities that
was limited in nature, and here there was no showing
86
had a "substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Then, in United States v. Morrison, this new "substantial relation" test was used to
bar application of the federal Violence Against Women Act in a civil action for damages
against a college whose student athletes allegedly raped a female student.8 7 Gendermotivated crimes "are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic88activity" and, therefore,
not within the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Nor could the Civil Rights Amendments 89 provide any authority for such
interference into a traditional area of state regulation. 90 Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment permits Congress to "enforce by appropriate legislation" the constitutional
guarantees found in section one of that amendment: that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person..
. equal protection of the laws." 9 1 It is also the vehicle by which the Bill of Rights was
incorporated and applied to the states. 92 In Morrison, as well as an earlier decided case,
City of Boerne v. Flores,93 the Supreme Court looked back to nineteenth-century
legislative history94 and precedents 95 to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to provide
rather,
that "Congress may not expand the scope of rights or create additional rights but,
' 96
only may provide remedies for [pre-existing] rights recognized by the judiciary.
A second but related change implemented by the Court was to re-invigorate the
Tenth Amendment. No longer was that provision a mere "truism." Federal laws that
compel states to enact statutes or regulations or administer federal programs violate state
97
In New
sovereignty, which is the core concept protected by the Tenth Amendment.
99
98
York v. United States, Justice O'Connor applied the Tenth Amendment to preclude
application of a federal statute that required New York to "take title" to low-level radio100
to "govern
active nuclear waste within its borders. To "commandeer[]" a state
1
title to waste, violates "the core of
according to Congress's instructions,"'' here to take102
state sovereignty" inherent in the Tenth Amendment.

86. Id at 662-63. The Court set out a test limiting Commerce Clause authority to three areas: (1) the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) activities having a
substantialrelation to interstate commerce or that substantiallyaffect interstate commerce. Id at 558-59.
87. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
88. Id at 613.
89. U.S. Const amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
90. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.
91. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17.
92. See Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
93. 521 U.S. 507.
94. Id. at 520-21.
95. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-22 (reviewing holding in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
96. Chemerinsky, supra n. 83, at 197.
97. Id.
98. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
99. Justice O'Connor had suggested a year earlier that she and others on the Court might be re-visiting the
impact of the Tenth Amendment. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1991) (interpretation of a
federal statute to not apply to state judges based on federalism and Tenth Amendment concerns).
100. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
101. Id at 162.
102. Id. at 177
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Similarly, a federal statute "commanding" state and local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain
related tasks 10 3 also violated the Tenth Amendment. 10 4 The Tenth Amendment means
that "there are things that are truly local in nature, such as intrastate violence and family
law. In those areas and others, Congress, under the Commerce Clause, may not
regulate." 10 5 Finally, as part of this "New Federalism, ' 06 the Court has used the
Eleventh Amendment and its implied immunity policy 107 to bar certain types of federal
08
lawsuits against state or state officials, even when Congress has authorized such suits. 1
The Court did carve out two exceptions.10 9 First, it created a "legal fiction" in Ex
Parte Young 110 that one could sue a state official' 11 to stop a continuing violation' 12 of

103. Pritz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
104. Id. at 935. The Court emphasized its holding in New York:
Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold
that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case
weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.
Id.
105. Belsky, supra n. 79, at 6.
106. "[T]he phrase 'New Federalism'---connote[s] criticism of central government and imply restoration of
power to the states." Shirley S. Abrahamson & Thomas N. Hilbank, Federalism, in The Burger Court:
Counter-Revolutionor Confirmation 173, 173 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Oxford U. Press 1998).
107. The history of the Eleventh Amendment has been described often. Article Ill, § 2 of the Constitution
provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to suits "between a State and Citizens of another
State" and "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." In Chisholm v.
Georgia,2 U.S. 419 (1793), the Supreme Court held that this provision permitted a citizen of one state to sue
another state in federal court without that state's consent. States responded by securing passage of the Eleventh
Amendment to take away the judicial power of the federal courts in such cases. The Amendment bars suits
"against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Despite this explicit language, in Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court interpreted the provision
to bar suits by a citizen against his or her own state under a federal statute in any court, not just in federal court,
but in any court. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706, 746-47 (1999) (citing and quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 10).
108. Belsky, supra n. 79, at 6.
109. It could be argued that there is a third exception. If the state, by clear and unmistakable action, waives
its immunity, it can be sued for damages and other monetary relief. See College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid,527
U.S. 666 (1999); Port Auth Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
110. 209 U.S. 123 (1909).
Ill. The "fiction" means that the individual has to be sued in his or her own name. For example, in
Papasanv. Allain, the Court held:
Where the State itself or one of its agencies or departments is not named as defendant and where a
state official is named instead, the Eleventh Amendment status of the suit is less straightforward....
[Ex parte Young's] holding was based on a determination that an unconstitutional state enactment is
void and that any action by a state official that is purportedly authorized by that enactment cannot
be taken in an official capacity since the state authorization for such action is a nullity.
478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986).
112. This exception only applied to prospective action. Actions for damages or retroactive payments are still
barred because they must be paid out of the state's treasury. Edelman v Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
Whether something is a retroactive payment or damages or merely incidental to a request for prospective relief
is a balancing/policy question. See e.g. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279-80 (trust income is retroactive monetary
damages and barred); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (payments ancillary to injunctive
order). If a state official is sued in his or her individual private capacity, there is no immunity bar. Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
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federal law 113 because that officer had to be acting without authority by the state ("ultra
vires"). The second exception is when the Eleventh Amendment policy is superceded by
another constitutional provision. Originally, an individual could sue a state when such a
suit was authorized by a federal statute, enacted by Congress under the authority granted
by any provision of the Constitution. 114 However, in 1996, the Court held that general
provisions of the Constitution did not authorize such suits. Congress could only
"abrogate the immunity" by laws passed pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and which explicitly
gave Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." 15 Even if a law did seem to be implementing a specific Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee, such as the religion provisions of the First Amendment
incorporated under the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, it could not
abrogate the state's immunity unless "congruence and proportionality between the injury
1
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end" were shown. 16
These Eleventh Amendment-premised restrictions provide the final vehicle to
implement the New Federalism. Even if there was authority for Congress to enact a law
and there were no restrictions imposed by the Tenth Amendment, implementation at the
state level could still be limited by narrowing the scope of enforcement. Two sets of
standards could result--one for the federal government and another for the states.
V.

THE REALLY NEW FEDERALISM-LOCKE AND 0 CENTRO

As indicated above, the Supreme Court has relaxed its standards for reviewing
actions by the government that might violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 117 As a result, both federal and state laws that provided for vouchers and
other faith-based services were found to be "neutral," not a basis for finding
constitutional invalidity. 118 In addition, providing "faith-based" services was now a key
119
element of federal policy.
I believed, as did many other scholars, "that the federal courts would not allow
state laws to be upheld that were inconsistent with federal policy, as expressed by the
federal legislature, and approved by the Supreme Court." 120 Yet, this is precisely the

113. At one point, it was believed that one could sue for violation of any law, but this was limited to
violations of federal law in Pennhurstv. Halderman,465 U.S. 89 (1984).
114. Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (general Commerce Clause authority).
115. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (Indian Commerce Clause). If a law did not fit explicitly
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment protections and thus within Congress's § 5 powers, it could not
be used to sue the state. Id; see also College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (Patent Clause).
116. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (Free Exercise Clause); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83
(2000) (age discrimination); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with
Disabilities Act compliance). When such "congruence and proportionality" was shown, immunity could be
abrogated. See Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (access to courthouse under Americans with Disability Act;
congressional showing of inaccessibility to state office buildings); Nev. Dept. of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (violation of Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; history of gender discrimination).
117. Review supra notes 63 to 69 and accompanying text.
118. See e.g. Zelman v. Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (state voucher program); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000) (federal funds to schools).
119. See Exec. Or. 13279, 3.C.F.R. 258 (2003).
120. Belsky, supra n. 62, at 281 (footnotes omitted, citing other authors).
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holding of Locke v. Davey.1 2 1 In that case, the Court reviewed a Washington state
provision that barred the giving of any state money for "religious worship, exercise or
instruction." ' 122 In the late 1800s, many states had passed similar constitutional
provisions, entitled "Blaine Amendments,"' 123 barring funding for parochial schools and
to keep public funds far away from
other religious uses. These provisions were attempts
12 4
use by new immigrant (mostly Catholic) groups.
The traditional wisdom before Locke v. Davey was that these [Blaine] laws, developed in a
time of and in response to religious prejudice, could not survive. They were inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence providing for a less restrictive review of First
Amendment limitations to funding of religious entities and programs. Specifically, under a
free speech analysis or free exercise analysis, biased restrictions on state funding could not
possibly be considered
a "compelling governmental interest" under the required "strict
25
scrutiny" review. 1

The State of Washington had a scholarship program to assist academically gifted
students, and Joshua Davey wanted one of these scholarships to study to be a
minister. 126 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld
Washington's constitutional provision and the ban on use of these state funds by Davey.
The United States Constitution had to allow a "play in the joints":
These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently
in tension. Yet we have long said that "there is room for play in the joints" between them.
In other words, there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not
27
required by the Free Exercise Clause. 1

The Court rejected a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause. Despite the history of
the enactment of these types of laws, it was "facially neutral" to religion. The state
merely decided not to fund a certain type of education.128 The Court also rejected 129 the
argument by dissenting Justices Scalia and Thomas that the Washington law
"discriminated against religion." 130
121. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). Much of the analysis in this discussion of Locke comes from Belsky, supra n 62,
at 282-85.
122. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 11; see also Locke, 540 U.S. at 716 (noting the provision at issue codifies the
State's constitutional prohibition).
123. These state laws are called "Blaine Amendments" because they are based on a federal constitutional
amendment proposed by Republican presidential aspirant James G. Blaine. In 1876, the proposed amendment
overwhelmingly passed the House but did not reach the two-thirds requirement in the Senate. Michael W.
McConnell, John H. Garvery & Thomas C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution 452-53 (Aspen Law & Bus.
2002). This law became the model for state laws, and Congress "demanded the inclusion of such provisions as
a condition to statehood in the Dakotas, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico. By 1890, some 29 states had
enacted some form of [this provision]." Id. at 457.
124. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws:
State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 495 (2003). For a survey of the
various Blaine provisions, review Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blame
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 551, 555-602
(2003).
125. Belsky, supra n. 62, at 282.
126. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715, 717.
127. Id. at 718-19 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 720-21.
129. Id. at 721.
130. Id. at 726 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Upholding the law was inconsistent with recent Supreme
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It is inconceivable that a federal law based on an animus to religion would be
upheld. 13 1 The difference here, with respect to a state law, is the desire by a majority of
132
the Court to balance "state's rights" with the new First Amendment jurisprudence.
That same desire led to the decision in 2006 in 0 Centro.
As indicated earlier, 133 in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a
strict scrutiny review of "neutral laws of general applicability" that might interfere with
religious practices. 134 In response to public pressure, Congress passed RFRA, 135 a
statute restoring that test to any law that substantially interfered with a religious
practice. 136 The explicit purpose of the RFRA was to overrule Employment Division in
all its aspects. 137 There is no mention of making any distinction between federal or state
13 8
laws. It was intended to apply strict scrutiny to both.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy for the Court, citing congressional
reports, stated, "Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in
enacting" RFRA. 139 He said that Congress had no power to do this. Writing for six
Justices, he found RFRA unconstitutional, not "a proper exercise of Congress' remedial
or preventive power." 14 0 By attempting to make a "substantive change" in constitutional
protections, 14 1 Congress, in RFRA, had violated "vital principles necessary to maintain

Court precedent and not even a "close call" to allow a "play in the joints." 540 U.S. at 728. Justice Thomas
added that "[a degree in] theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith." Id. at 734.
13 1. Four years before Locke, Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality in Mitchell v. Helms, overturned a
lower court decision and upheld a federal statute providing funds to sectarian schools. 530 U.S. 793. He
specifically considered and rejected the premise behind Blaine laws, arguing that these laws were based on
"pervasive hostility to the Catholic church and Catholics in general." Id at 828-29. Justice Kennedy joined
that opinion, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist, who both joined the majority in Locke. Justice O'Connor
concurred. As I indicated in my 2004 article on Locke, for these justices the difference was the "balance
between the new Supreme Court precedents on the application of the religion clauses and state authority and
sovereignty." Belsky, supra n. 62, at 285; see id. at 285-92 (reviewing the jurisprudence on these issues by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 0' Connor, and Justice Kennedy); see also Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis
in Locke:
And the subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions embody
distinct views-in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment-that find no counterpart
with respect to other callings or professions. That a State would deal differently with religious
education for the ministry than with education for other callings is a product of these views, not
evidence of hostility toward religion.
540 U.S. at 722.
132. See Belsky, supra n. 62. Technically, Chief Justice Rehnquist in his opinion limited the scope of Locke
to the funding of the training of ministers and did not address the more general application of Blaine-type laws.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 720, 723 & n. 7. Most commentators and at least one court believe that the Court would and
will uphold other state laws barring religious activity and funding, based on the federalism balance. See
Belsky, supra n. 62, at 293-94.
133 Review supra notes 70 to 76 and accompanying text.
134. Belsky, supra n. 46, at 96.
135. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
136. Id. at98.
137. See id at § 2000bb(a)(4) & (b).
138. Id at § 2000bb-2(l); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532; see Edward J.W. Blatnik, Student Author, No RFRAF
Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1411 (1998).
139. 521 U.S. at 516 (citing both Senate and House reports).
140. Id. at 529.
141. Id at 532.
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separation of powers and the federal balance." 14 2 Justice Kennedy in City of Boerne is
highly critical of the power of Congress to enact the statute at all. 143 And although the
Congress did rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, it also relied on congressional power to
' 144
"enforce the free exercise clause."
Most courts reviewing the decision soon after its issuance believed the Court had
declared RFRA unconstitutional for all government action.1 4 5 Even if the decision could
be found to be ambiguous, 146 it certainly was at least an issue whether RFRA could
apply to federal actions. 147 In a later decision 148 reviewing the validity of the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 149 the Court
noted that the issue of application of RFRA to the federal government was not yet
decided. 150 Yet, when Chief Justice Roberts reviewed a federal statute under RFRA in
0 Centro, he did not even mention City of Boerne. For a unanimous Court, 15 1 he just
152
went ahead and applied the compelling interest test.
VI.

CONCLUSION

An adage, which I have used before, 15 3 states, "[w]here you stand depends on
where you sit." Perhaps a variation can be "where and how you practice your religion
depends on where you live and what government entity is involved." If you are in a state
with a so-called Blaine Amendment, funding by a state for a religious program may be
barred, but funding by the federal government would not be. That is the holding of
Locke v. Davey. If you are in a state that passes a law barring a religious practice, that
state only needs to show that the law was a "neutral one" of "general applicability," and

142. Id.at 536. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent arguing that Employment Division was "gravely at odds
with our earlier free exercise decisions." Id.at 548. Therefore, the Court should use the Boerne case to
reconsider and overrule Employment Division. 521 U.S. at 544-65. Justices Souter and Breyer also wrote
dissenting opinions. Id at 565-66.
143. Id. at 532. Justice Kennedy argued,
RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter. RFRA's restrictions apply to every agency and official of the Federal, State, and local
Governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(l). RFRA applies to all federal and state law, statutory or
otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment. § 2000bb-3(a). RFRA has no termination
date or termination mechanism. Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual who
alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.
Id.
144. Sen. Rpt. 103-11 at 13-14 (July 27, 1993); H.R. Rpt. 103-88 at 9 (May 11, 1993) (Necessary and
Proper Clause and the First Amendment).
145. See Blatnik, supran. 138, at 1411-13.
146. See id.
147. For an argument in favor of applying RFRA to federal actions, review Blatnik, supra note 138.
148. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). The implications of this decision will be discussed later.
Review infra notes 161 to 64 and accompanying text.
149. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (Supp. 2005)).
150. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715 n. 2. Cutter dealt with RLUIPA, which was passed in partial response to
Boerne. Id.at 715.
151. Justice Alito did not participate.
152. 126 S. Ct. at 1225.
153. Martin H. Belsky, A Practicaland PragmaticApproach to Freedom of Conscience, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1057, 1076 (2005).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss3/3

14

Belsky: The Religion Clauses and the Really New Federalism
2007]

THE "REALLY NEW" FEDERALISM

it will be upheld. If the federal government attempts to apply a similar law to the same
practice, it would have to show a compelling interest for that rule and that the application
of the rule was as narrow as possible. That is the holding of 0 Centro. Whether we call
this a "play in the joints",154 or allowing the states to "act as laboratories,"1 55 it is
discomforting to have separate sets of rules when dealing with basic aspects of our lives,
such as how we can or cannot practice our religions.
Some reconciliation of these sets of policies-at least as far as the free exercise of
religion is concerned--may be possible. 156 In 2000, Congress passed RLUIPA. This
statute was an attempt to partially respond to City of Boerne v. Flores. Two areas,
prisons and land use regulation, were selected where the compelling government
interest/least restrictive means test could be applied to substantial burdens on religion.
157
Congress documented in hearings over three years the special need for this legislation.
Congress, believing that City of Boerne applied to all government actions, then stipulated
158
that RLUIPA would apply to all government actions, state and federal.
The Supreme Court reviewed the application of this statute to an Ohio prison rule
restricting exercise of a religious practice by a minority religious group. 159 In an
unanimous opinion, the Court upheld RLUIPA's application of the compelling
government interest/least restrictive means test to stop the state of Ohio from applying a
"neutral law."
At least as to prisons, this law did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 160 The Court did not consider the source of authority for the statute (as it had in
City of Boerne).
While technical distinctions can be made between the justifications for RLUIPA
and RFRA, 16 1 the Court may be willing to reconsider the whole premise of RFRA and
allow Congress, with sufficient justification for specific cases, to re-establish the strict
scrutiny review for an increasing number of situations and all jurisdictions. Hopefully,
the Court will agree soon to hear a case on the application of RLUIPA to a land-use
decision. 162 Perhaps that decision will indicate whether-again at least on the free
exercise aspect-one set of standards will be applied.

154. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713, Locke, 540 U.S. at 718..
155. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
156. Of course, another way to reconcile two sets of standards is to have the states include a RFRA in their
own laws and constitutions. Many states have, in fact, enacted their own religious freedom acts. See
Christopher Andrew Eason, Student Author, 0 Centro v. Ashcroft: American Indians' Efforts to Secure
Religious Freedoms Are Pavingthe Way for Other Minority Religious Groups, 28 Am. Indian L. Rev. 327, 333
(2003-2004).
157. Cutter,544 U.S. at 716.
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a), 2000cc-I(a).
159. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 709.
160. Id at 724.
161. The Court said that RLUIPA was based on the Commerce and Spending Clauses and did not address
whether RLUIPA exceeded Congress's legislative powers. Id. at 718 n. 7. In addition, the Act was limited to
prison cases and was based on extensive hearings.
162. See e.g. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 309 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2002); Primera Iglesia
BautistaHispano v. FrowardCo., 450 F.3d 1295 (11 th Cir. 2006); see Edwin P. Voss, Jr. & Meredith A. Ladd,
Recent Developments under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 37 Urb. Law. 449
(2005).
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